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We examine face-to-face interaction in a two-person bargaining game with incom-
plete information in which each bargainer can either have costs to be subtracted
from his/her bargaining agreement payoff or not. The bargaining events are ob-
served by onlookers who guess the cost situations of the participants. The work
of D. Gauthier (1978, Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon) and R. H. Frank
(1988, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: Norton)
suggests that the onlookers’ detection accuracy exceeds chance accuracy because of
involuntary signals inherent in the behavior of the bargainers. It is shown that cost
guesses are somewhat more accurate than chance. This effect, however, is entirely
explainable by the onlookers’ information about objective features of the bargain-
ing process. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C70, C91, D70,
D82.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is often suggested in the literature that bargainers cannot convinc-
ingly lie because they cannot avoid involuntary signals like facial move-
ments or voice inﬂection which provide hints about the emotional state of
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the speaker. The philosopher David Gauthier, for instance, built his the-
ory of “morals by agreement” on the premise that people are “translucent”
in the sense that they are able “to detect others’ sincerity or insincerity”
(1978, p. 181). Also, many papers in evolutionary game theory are based on
this assertion which we shall refer to as the hypothesis of involuntary truth-
signalling in the following. Frank’s (1987, 1988) approach to the evolution
of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas as well as Robson’s (1990) biolog-
ical “secret handshake” model may be the most prominent models that
make use of the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling in an evolution-
ary context. Varieties of the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling have
been proposed by Hirshleifer (1987) and Schelling (1978) in papers which
have found less attention, and probably also by others. As far as we know,
however, nobody has ever supplied convincing empirical evidence for the
hypothesis in a bargaining context. Gauthier and Frank explicitly put the
hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling into such a context. It is therefore
of interest to examine the hypothesis in experimental bargaining games.
In an experiment by Frank et al. (1993) subjects, before playing a pris-
oner’s dilemma, had the opportunity to talk to their opponents about the
problem and were then asked to predict whether they would cooperate or
not. It turned out that they succeeded much more than randomly expected
in correctly predicting non-cooperative behavior but to a much (although
not signiﬁcantly) smaller extent cooperative behavior. The paper does not
report the content of the conversations. It is possible that some subjects
openly or implicitly declared that they did not want to cooperate and there-
fore were expected not to do so.2 Therefore the experiment does not clarify
what was deducible from verbal statements and what was due to the recog-
nition of involuntary signals. Moreover, the payoff scheme was such that
most of the variance was due to a random payoff component added in or-
der to make it impossible for the subject to ﬁnd out afterward whether an
opponent has cooperated or not. Therefore the behavior in the games was
relatively unimportant for the ﬁnal payoff. There was no payment for the
correctness of the prediction.
In the psychological literature the question of whether deception can
be detected has been addressed in quite a number of investigations. An
overview is given by Zuckerman et al. (1981). In these studies subjects are
usually told by the experimenter whether they should lie or tell the truth
and no monetary incentives are supplied. A typical task was that a subject
2There is, however, a very brief sketch of the content of “many” of the subjects’ conversa-
tions in Frank (1988, Chap. 7) which suggests that subjects did not explicitly announce that
they were going to defect. Yet, in a similar prisoner’s dilemma experiment by Brosig (1998)
a non-negligible share of subjects explicitly and some implicitly stated that they would not
cooperate.
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should talk badly about somebody else whom he or she liked and appreci-
ated or he or she should praise somebody whom he or she did not think to
be worthy of praise at all. In the paper by Zuckerman et al. (1981, p. 26)
we ﬁnd the following summarizing statement:
In fact, the examination of actual percentage accuracy indicates that most of the
results fall in the 0.45–0.60 range with a chance level of 0.5 (see Kraut, 1980;
Knapp and Comadena, 1979; Miller and Burgoon, 1981).3
The paper also investigates the basis of this detection capability. Treat-
ment conditions varied according to whether the face or the body could
be seen or not and whether speech could be heard or not. Surprisingly,
the highest detection capability was observed when speech could be heard
and the body could be observed but not the face. This suggests that facial
clues are misleading rather than informative. Moreover, most of what is
transmitted by speech seems to be discovered also by those who only saw
transcripts. Zuckerman et al. (1981, p. 27) summarize the results as follows:
The surprising ﬁnding, of course, is the power (i.e., the accuracy) of the word,
either written or spoken. The assumption that non-verbal channels are more
important in the communication of deception than the verbal clues is simply not
true (see DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, and Rosenkrantz, 1981).
The psychological studies suggest that the hypothesis of involuntary truth-
signalling may have some merit even if the effects are weak. However, this
may be due to the nature of the task because subjects told to tell lies may
feel quite different about this than a bargainer who misrepresents his or her
situation. Therefore it is of interest to investigate the hypothesis of invol-
untary truth-signalling in the context of bargaining experiments. Unlike the
subjects in most psychological experiments, the subjects in the environment
of our bargaining experiment are motivated by non-negligible monetary in-
centives and are free to choose whether they want to tell the truth or not.4
The bargaining situation with incomplete information underlying our ex-
periment is very simple. Two bargainers have to divide a ﬁxed sum of money
but they may or may not have costs to be deducted from the bargaining
results in case of an agreement. There is two-sided incomplete informa-
tion about the cost situation of the other player. Selten (1975) applied the
noncooperative model by Harsanyi and Selten (1972) to this bargaining sit-
uation. Experiments on the basis of the same noncooperative bargaining
3 Similar summarizing statements can be found in articles by Gilovich et al. (1998), Anderson
et al. (1999), and others.
4The design of our experiments is similar to unpublished pilot experiments by Selten and
Stoecker (1978) performed at the University of Bielefeld under less controlled conditions.
Bargainers and onlookers were non-academics visiting the university at an “open day.” The
results with respect to the capability of detection were similar to those of the study reported
here. However, bargaining was not video-taped and the number of bargaining events was
rather small. Many questions raised here cannot be examined with the help of this material.
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model were performed by Hogatt et al. (1978). Kuon (1994) theoretically
and experimentally applied the Rubinstein model (1985a,b) of alternating
bid bargaining to a similar situation. The experiments presented here are
not based on a complex noncooperative bargaining model but on face-
to-face interaction followed by just one round of simultaneous agreement
proposals.
2. THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment consisted of two sessions. In each session 24 subjects
participated as bargainers. In addition to this a number of other subjects,
42 in session 1 and 46 in session 2, had the role of onlookers. The bar-
gainers were students of the University of Magdeburg studying a variety of
ﬁelds, mostly economics, in different semesters. We tried to avoid bargain-
ing between people who were acquainted with each other. Bargainers were
only matched into a bargaining pair if they declared that they did not know
each other. All onlookers were students of economics.
2.1. Procedure
A session was a sequence of 12 bargaining events. In each bargaining
event two subjects bargained about the division of DM 30. The bargaining
was face-to-face, observed by the onlookers, and video-taped. The bargain-
ers separately arrived about 20 minutes before their bargaining events, read
the instructions, and gave up all rights with respect to the video recordings
to the experimenter (see Appendix A for all instructions). Then the bar-
gainers had to throw a dice in order to determine whether they would have
costs of DM 12 or not. In the case of a throw of 1, 2, 3 subjects had costs
and in the case of a throw of 4, 5, 6 there were no costs. The cost situation
of a bargainer was private information. The costs were subtracted from the
subject’s agreement payoff if agreement was reached.
At the start of the bargaining event, two bargainers were brought to a
lecture hall, where they talked for maximally 10 minutes. The bargainers
could stop their conversation earlier if they wanted to do so. Afterward
each bargainer separately and secretly ﬁlled in forms in which each of both
wrote down the agreement reached according to his or her understanding.
Moreover, each of them had to ﬁll in a guess about whether the other
one had costs or not. Afterward both bargainers, one after another, were
led to a separate room where the payments were made, unobserved by the
other bargainer and the onlookers. If both forms agreed with respect to the
division of the DM 30, payments according to the agreement were made
with costs deducted if there were any. If the forms were in disagreement the
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bargainers received zero payoffs from the game. In addition to the payoff
from the game, each bargainer received a show up fee of DM 10. Overall,
average bargainer earnings were DM 19.88 with a minimum of DM 10 and
a maximum of DM 29. The average time needed for the whole experiment
was about half an hour.
Onlookers were fully informed about the bargaining rules. They were
seated in the lecture hall such that they had a good view of the bargainers
but could not communicate with their neighbors. The task of the onlookers
was to guess who among the bargainers had costs and who had no costs.
The guessed cost situation for each bargainer was marked with a cross in a
decision form. The onlookers were paid according to the following scheme
in each session: DM 300 were divided among those who had the highest
number of correct guesses achieved, DM 100 were divided among those
who had the second highest number of correct guesses, and DM 50 were
divided among those who had the third highest number of correct guesses.
The maximum earnings in sessions 1 and 2 were DM 100 and DM 300,
respectively. Session 1 lasted about 80 minutes and session 2 about 70 min-
utes.
2.2. Remarks
Theoretically it is possible that an agreement is reached in which one
bargainer with costs receives less than DM 12. In the instructions the bar-
gainers were told that in the case of costs they had to insist on at least
DM 12 if they did not want to face a loss. Losses would be deducted from
the show up fee. In fact, losses did not occur.
The instructions explicitly told the subjects to try to maximize their pay-
offs. This was done in order to direct attention as much as possible to the
money payoff.
The experimental setup did not permit a bargainer to prove to the other
one that he or she had costs. Also, after the bargaining, it was kept se-
cret whether a bargainer had costs or not. The onlookers did not get any
information about which of their guesses were correct.
Bargainers were not permitted to communicate with each other before
the bargaining and were separated after the bargaining event in order to
provide no easy opportunities for retrospective communication. They were
also not able to see any bargaining events other than their own. Communi-
cation among onlookers was prohibited and successfully prevented.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Table I shows the results of all bargaining events. In the following we
explain the entries in the table together with some summary remarks:
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Column 1 (bargainer identiﬁcation number): Each bargainer has an
identiﬁcation number consisting of the bargaining event number and a let-
ter A or B. The ﬁrst 12 bargaining event numbers refer to session 1 and
the second 12 to session 2.
Column 2 (bargaining costs): The entry is 1 if the bargainer had costs
and 0 if he or she had none. In session 1, 12 out of the 24 bargainers had
costs whereas in session 2 only 8 out of the 24 bargainers had costs.
Column 3 (outcome): The entry shows the game payoff in German
marks before the deduction of costs. Eighteen of the 24 bargaining pairs
agreed on DM 15 for each of both. Conﬂict was reached only in one case.
In ﬁve cases an agreement was reached in which one bargainer received
more than the other.
Column 4 (correctly guessed by opponent): In the case of an entry of 1
the opponent correctly guessed whether the bargainer had costs or not. In
the case of an entry of 0 the opponent’s guess was wrong. The percentage
of correct guesses by bargainers in both sessions is 52.1%.
Column 5 (onlooker hit rate): The entry is the percentage of correct
guesses over all onlookers of the session. The star indicates signiﬁcance
according to the two-sided binomial test at the signiﬁcance level of 5%. The
test is based on the null hypothesis that both guesses are equally probable.
The average percentage of correct guesses by onlookers in both sessions is
55.2%.
Column 6 (cost assertion): An entry of 1 indicates that the bargainer
explicitly asserted in the bargaining event that he or she had costs. In the
case of an entry of 0 he or she did not make such an assertion. In those
bargaining events in which both bargainers asserted costs, an “(f)” indicates
that the bargainer was the ﬁrst of both who asserted to have costs.
Twelve of the 20 bargainers who had costs correctly asserted that they
had costs. Twelve of the 28 bargainers without costs falsely asserted that
they had costs. Nobody ever said explicitly that they had no costs.
Column 7 (ﬁrst aggressive demand): We use the term “aggressive” for
demands of more than DM 15 and an entry of 1 indicates that the bargainer
was the ﬁrst one to make an aggressive demand. Otherwise the entry is 0.
If one of both bargainers has an entry of 1, obviously the other one must
have an entry of 0. In seven cases, none of both bargainers asked for more
than DM 15 for themselves so that both entries are 0.
Column 8 (ﬁrst fair demand): We refer to a demand of exactly DM 15
as “fair.” An entry of 1 indicates that the bargainer was the ﬁrst one to make
a fair demand. Otherwise the entry is 0. In bargaining event 13 neither
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of the bargainers had an entry of 1 because an aggressive demand was
accepted before a fair demand was made. In all other cases there was a
player who ﬁrst faced a fair demand.
Column 9 (bargaining time): The entry shows the time until the end
of the bargaining conversations in minutes. The maximum of 10 minutes
was reached only once in bargaining event 7. The average bargaining time
was 2.30 minutes.
Column 10 (male/female): “m” stands for male and “f” for female.
Nine out of the 48 bargainers were female.
Column 11 (economics student): “ec” stands for economics student and
“n-ec” for other students. Thirty-two of the 48 bargainers studied eco-
nomics.
4. OVERALL DETECTION CAPABILITY
In this section, we look at whether the data show a signiﬁcant over-
all detection capability or, in other words, whether the percentage of cor-
rect guesses is signiﬁcantly higher than the randomly expected 50%. How-
ever, we do not want to make the assumption that the probabilities of
correct guesses are the same for different onlookers and different bargain-
ers judged by the same onlookers. If there is no overall detection capability
one would expect a mean value of 12 correct guesses of an onlooker.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 88 numbers of correct guesses of an
onlooker.5 The mode and the median of the distribution is 14 and the mean
is 13.22. We test the null hypothesis that the data summarized by Fig. 1 are
a sample from a distribution with mean value 12. This hypothesis is rejected
by the Wilcoxon signed rank test on a very high level of signiﬁcance (p =
0000, two-sided). As we shall see later, this result needs to be interpreted
with care. In some cases it is easy to make a correct guess on the basis of
very simple criteria which have nothing to do with involuntary signalling of
truth.
We now turn our attention to the guesses of the bargainers about their
opponent’s cost situation. These guesses are correct in only 52.1% of all
cases. In comparison to the onlookers who correctly guessed in 55.2% of
all cases (cf. Table I), the bargainers were less accurate. The difference
between the two numbers is very small and seems to be compatible with
the idea that the probability of a correct guess is not different for bargain-
ers and onlookers. It is difﬁcult, however, to support this impression by an
5The individual guesses of all onlookers are shown in Table IV in Appendix B.
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FIG. 1. Distribution of correct guesses of an onlooker.
adequate statistical test, since probabilities must be suspected to be differ-
ent for different onlookers and for different bargainers judged by the same
onlookers.
The bargainers’ judgements on the cost situations of their opponents
correlate with the onlooker hit rates (columns 4 and 5 in Table I). The
biserial rank correlation coefﬁcient is 0.337 which is not very high but the
associated Mann–Whitney U-test is signiﬁcant at the level p = 0021 (two-
sided).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of onlooker hit rates over bargainers
listed in column 5 of Table I. The ﬁgure also exhibits the theoretical distri-
FIG. 2. Distribution of hit rates over bargainers.
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bution which would be obtained if the probability of a correct guess were
the same for every bargainer, namely, the observed overall relative fre-
quency 55.2% of correct guesses, and also independent of each other.
Obviously, the theoretical distribution does not agree with the data. Ac-
cording to the theoretical distribution, at least one hit rate either greater
than 80% or smaller than 30% has a probability of less than 5%. Never-
theless such hit rates are observed in 19 of 48 cases.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the probabilities of a correct guess by an on-
looker are different for different bargainers. It appears that the cost situa-
tion of the bargainer is easy to assess in some cases and very difﬁcult to be
correctly guessed in some other cases.
As we have explained above, the stars in column 5 indicate that the
corresponding onlooker hit rate is different from 50% at the two-sided
signiﬁcance level of 5%. This is the case for 29 of the 48 hit rates. In 18
of these 29 cases the hit rates are above 50%, but in 11 cases they are
below. For these 11 bargainers the guesses of the onlookers are signiﬁcantly
worse than random. As far as there is a capability of detecting the true cost
situations, it fails miserably in these cases.
5. THE INFLUENCE OF OBJECTIVE FEATURES OF THE
BARGAINING PROCESS ON THE CORRECTNESS OF GUESSES
Why is it that onlookers have a very good capability to judge the cost
situations of some bargainers and a very bad capability for others? In or-
der to ﬁnd the reasons, we analyze the objective features of the bargaining
process in this section. By objective features we mean characteristics of the
bargaining process which can either be clearly seen in the transcripts or
which are in other ways apparent from the bargaining process without any
information coming from visual channels like facial expression and body
postures or auditory channels like voice intonation. Such features are the
ﬁnal bargaining result and the bargaining time. The features clearly indi-
cated by the transcripts are the cost assertions and the ﬁrst aggressive and
ﬁrst fair demand. In this respect the transcripts are unambiguous.6
In connection with the objective features of the bargaining process, three
different questions suggest themselves: Which objective features are good
indicators of the cost situations of the bargainers? To what extent are these
objective features responsible for the fact that onlookers judge the true
cost situations somewhat more accurately than randomly expected? Which
other features inﬂuence the guesses of the onlookers?
6The transcripts (in German) are available from the authors upon request.
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In the following, we shall ﬁrst look at those features which are good indi-
cators of the actual cost situation; these are the ﬁnal bargaining result and
the bargaining time. It will then be shown that these features are responsi-
ble for the better than randomly guessing success of the onlookers. Finally,
we shall present a probit analysis of the onlookers’ guessing behavior that
takes into account other objective features.
5.1. Actual Costs, Cost Guesses, and Final Bargaining Results
In ﬁve bargaining events the ﬁnal bargaining result was asymmetric in
the sense that an agreement was reached in which one bargainer received
a higher share of the gross payoff of DM 30 than the other one. In such
situations the onlookers tend to judge that the bargainer with the higher
gross payoff has costs and the bargainer with the lower payoff has no costs.
In fact, on average over all ﬁve bargaining events, the onlookers guess in
75% that the bargainer with the higher gross payoff has costs and in 93.6%
of all cases that the bargainer with the lower gross payoff has no costs. The
second tendency is fully justiﬁed in each of the ﬁve cases. The bargainers
with the lower gross payoffs have no costs. The ﬁrst tendency, however, is
mistaken. Among all ﬁve bargainers with a higher gross payoff, only one
has costs.7
The data just discussed show that a lower gross payoff in an asymmet-
ric ﬁnal result is a good indicator of no costs. Contrary to this, however, a
higher gross payoff is not a good indicator of costs. For instance, the bar-
gainer with the highest gross proﬁt (DM 19) had no costs, but 93.5% of the
onlookers guessed that he had costs.
The guessing tendencies of the onlookers in face of asymmetric bargain-
ing results are also reﬂected by a highly signiﬁcant negative rank corre-
lation coefﬁcient of −0540 (p = 0001, two-sided) between a bargainer’s
gross payoff and the onlooker hit rates (columns 3 and 5 in Table I). The
onlookers make strong use of the fact that a lower gross payoff is a good
indicator for no costs and thereby improve their hit rates.
Conﬂict with zero payoffs for both bargainers was reached in only one
bargaining event. In this event, both bargainers had costs. For one of the
bargainers, 62% of the onlookers guessed that he had costs but for the other
one only 29%. One might think that a conﬂict indicates a high probability
7In three of the ﬁve cases the lower gross payoff was higher than DM 12, in one it was DM
12, and in another one it was DM 11. At least in the last case it is almost obvious that the
bargainer with the lower gross payoff had no costs, even if it was not excluded by the rules
that participants with costs accepted less than their costs of DM 12.
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for both bargainers having costs. However, in the one case observed in our
data, the onlookers do not seem to be guided by such considerations.
5.2. Actual Costs, Cost Guesses, and Bargaining Time
Five bargaining events ended after extremely short times of at most half
a minute. In all these cases an agreement of equal gross payoffs of DM 15
was reached. Within half a minute, the bargainers cannot do much more
than to express their willingness to accept a fair division. This led us to
the decision to draw the line between extremely short and other bargaining
events at half a minute.
Only 1 of the 10 bargainers involved in the ﬁve extremely short bargaining
events had costs; 9 had no costs. The onlookers had the tendency to make
a guess of no costs if the bargaining time was extremely short. On average
a bargainer involved in the ﬁve bargaining events was judged by 75% of
the onlookers to have no costs. Also, the 1 bargainer who had costs was
judged by 70% of the onlookers not to have costs. The average hit rate for
the short bargaining events is 71.1%.
In the bargaining events lasting for more than half a minute, 50% of the
bargainers had costs and the onlookers on average judged 55% of them to
have no costs. The average hit rate in these cases is only 51%.
Within the bargaining events lasting more than half a minute, there seems
to be no difference between longer and shorter bargaining times with re-
spect to the actual cost situations. Median tests used to examine these
questions do not yield signiﬁcant results. However, there is a sharp differ-
ence between the extremely short and the longer bargaining events. A four
ﬁeld table χ2-test yields a signiﬁcance of p = 0022 (two-sided) for the
difference of actual costs.
As we have seen, a short bargaining time is a good indicator of both
bargainers having no costs. The onlookers make use of this indicator and
thereby increase their hit rates considerably above random level in these
cases.8
5.3. Hit Rates Unaided by Bargaining Time and Result Asymmetry
In this section, we want to examine whether the objective criteria based
on short bargaining time and lower gross payoff in asymmetric results ex-
8It is remarkable that in bargaining experiments with anonymous interaction there is a
concentration of agreements reached in the very last seconds before the deadline. Roth et al.
(1988, p. 806), for instance, state that the deadline effect is “one of the clearest phenomena
observed in bargaining experiments to date”. In our face-to-face experiments, however, only
2 out of 24 bargaining events were still going on in the last two minutes.
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plain the fact that onlookers succeed in achieving hit rates which on the
average are signiﬁcantly better than random. For this purpose, we deﬁne
an adjusted hit rate. In order to do this, we look at the reduced set of bar-
gainers without the 10 participants involved in extremely short bargaining
events and the 5 participants who received lower gross payoffs than their
opponents. The adjusted hit rate of an onlooker is his or her hit rate for
the remaining bargainers in this reduced set.
The mean adjusted hit rate of the 88 onlookers is 44.5%. Based on a
normal approximation we can compute a 99%-conﬁdence interval for the
mean of the distribution of adjusted hit rates. The lower bound of this
conﬁdence interval is 41.07% and the upper bound is 47.99%.
It is safe to conclude that without the criteria of extremely short bar-
gaining time and lower gross payoff in an asymmetric bargaining result, the
capability of the onlookers to make correct judgements about the true cost
situations is worse than random. The upper limit of the 99% conﬁdence
interval is clearly below 50%.
Obviously, these results speak against the involuntary truth-signalling hy-
pothesis. Unaided by the objective criteria of short bargaining time and
lower gross payoff, the onlookers do not perceive involuntary signals which
help them to form correct guesses. On the contrary, to some extent, on-
lookers seemed to be systematically misled as the 99%-conﬁdence interval
suggests.
5.4. Correlations among Objective Features and Their Relation to Actual Costs
It is the purpose of this section to describe the interrelationship between
the objective features of the bargaining process and their connection with
actual costs. In addition to the criteria of lower gross payoff and short bar-
gaining time, we also look at the presence of cost assertion, ﬁrst aggressive
demand, and ﬁrst fair demand (columns 6, 7, and 8 in Table I). All these
features are 0–1 variables. The value of the lower gross payoff criterion is
deﬁned as 1 if the gross payoff is lower than DM 15 and 0 otherwise. Sim-
ilarly, the value of the short bargaining time criterion is deﬁned as 1 if the
bargaining time does not exceed half a minute and 0 otherwise.
The correlations among the objective features are shown in Table II. The
table also shows correlations with the presence of actual costs (according
to column 2 in Table II). The signiﬁcance of correlations of the lower gross
payoff and short bargaining time criteria with actual costs conﬁrm what has
been pointed out earlier in this respect. The other three correlations of
actual costs with the remaining three objective features are not signiﬁcant.
There are only two signiﬁcant correlations among the objective features:
one between the short bargaining time criterion and cost assertion and one
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TABLE II
Correlations among Objective Features and Their Relation to Actual Costs
Short First Actual
Objective bargaining Cost aggressive First fair bargaining
features time assertion demand demand costs
Lower gross
payoff −0175 −0205 −0253 0219 −0288a
Short bargaining
time −0308a −0273 0021 −0330a
Cost assertion 0305a −0125 0169
First aggressive
demand −0274 0081
First fair
demand 0204
a Signiﬁcant on the 5% level (two-sided).
between cost assertion and ﬁrst aggressive demand. The ﬁrst one is due to
the fact that cost assertions are not typical for short bargaining times. The
second one may be due to a tendency to buttress ﬁrst aggressive demands
by cost assertions.
The positive correlation between ﬁrst fair demand and actual bargaining
costs is in an unexpected direction. It suggests that somebody with costs
is more likely to make a ﬁrst fair demand than somebody without costs.
However, this effect is not signiﬁcant. All other correlations are in the
expected directions.
A correlation which is not expressed by Table II is that between the pres-
ence of cost assertions of both bargainers in the same bargaining event. The
data convey the impression that a cost assertion on one side is responded
by a cost assertion by the other side. In order to examine this impression
statistically, we construct a null hypothesis based on a simple theory pro-
ceeding from the assumption that bargainers with and without costs have
probabilities of making a cost assertion which do not depend on the situ-
ation and the behavior on the other side. We estimate the probabilities by
the relative frequencies observed in the data and then compute expected
values for the numbers of bargaining events with two, one, or no cost as-
sertions. With this simple theory as null hypothesis, we performed a χ2-test
which yields a signiﬁcance of p = 0055 (two-sided). The test conﬁrms the
impression that a cost assertion on one side provokes a defense by a cost
assertion on the other side. Not only the number of cases in which both bar-
gainers made a cost assertion but also the number of those in which none
of them made a cost assertion is greater than randomly expected under the
null hypothesis.
truth-signalling in bargaining 105
TABLE III
Probit Model
Coefﬁcient
Variables values t-values
Constant −1770 −11236
Lower gross payoff −1093 −7826
Short bargaining time −0427 −5315
Cost assertion 0140 2215
First aggressive demand 0610 9215
First fair demand −0242 −3968
5.5. A Probit Analysis
In the following we want to look at which objective features have a sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence on the guessing behavior of the onlookers. We shall try
to answer this question with the help of a probit model. Table III shows the
results. The independent variables are the ﬁve objective features discussed
above (cf. Table II) and the dependent variable is the guess of an onlooker
about the cost situation of a bargainer (cf. Table IV in Appendix B). There
are 88 onlookers, each of whom had to make 24 guesses.
Admittedly, the probit analysis makes strong independence assumptions
which are unlikely to be satisﬁed. The same behavior is attributed to each
onlooker and all guessing events are assumed to be independent of each
other. Nevertheless, the probit analysis has some descriptive relevance even
if the underlying model cannot really be taken seriously.9
The statistical analysis indicates that all ﬁve objective features have signif-
icant inﬂuence on the cost guesses. In particular, the probit analysis reveals
a strong inﬂuence of the variable ﬁrst aggressive demand on the cost guess.
This inﬂuence is smaller than that of the lower gross payoff criterion but
greater than that of the short bargaining time criterion. The strong inﬂu-
ence of the variable ﬁrst aggressive demand in the probit analysis is in con-
trast to the small correlation of the variable with actual costs. This suggests
that trying to make the ﬁrst aggressive demand is to some extent effective
in conveying the impression of costs. To a lesser degree something similar
9We also performed Mann–Whitney U-tests which for every one of the ﬁve variables com-
pared the 88 independent hit rates for the criterion value zero with the hit rates for the value
one. All these tests are signiﬁcant on the 1%-level (two-sided). For the variables ﬁrst aggres-
sive demand, ﬁrst fair demand, and cost assertion, the same tests were performed for the
adjusted hit rates. These tests are signiﬁcant at the 1%-level (two-sided) for ﬁrst fair and ﬁrst
aggressive demand and yield p = 0073 (two-sided) for cost assertion. All effects point into
the same direction as in the probit analysis.
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can be said about cost assertions. The ﬁrst fair demand, however, seems to
suggest an absence of costs to the onlookers, even if the correlation with
actual costs is slightly positive.
The inﬂuence of the cost assertions on the guesses of the onlookers does
not seem to depend on whether they are correct or not. Twelve bargain-
ers correctly assert that they have costs and twelve others make false cost
assertions. In the case of true cost assertions, 47% of the onlookers on av-
erage guess the presence of costs. The corresponding percentage for false
cost assertions is 55%. The reduced set of bargainers underlying the ad-
justed hit rates shows a similar picture. Here, the percentages are 47% for
11 true cost assertions and 51% for 6 false cost assertions. The differences
between the percentages are in the opposite direction of what one would
expect according to the involuntary truth-signalling hypothesis.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The results of our experiments clearly speak against the involuntary truth-
signalling hypothesis. As we have seen, the capability of onlookers to make
cost guesses which are somewhat more frequently correct than randomly
expected can entirely be explained by the objective criteria of lower gross
payoff and short bargaining time. These readily available features of the
bargaining process (and not involuntary signals) enable the onlookers to
guess somewhat more accurately than chance.
The adjusted hit rates which eliminate the inﬂuences of the two objective
criteria reveal a guessing accuracy worse than chance. The 99%-conﬁdence
interval for the mean of the adjusted hit rates has a lower bound of 0.41
and an upper bound of 0.48. One can conclude that at least on average
the onlookers not only fail to proﬁt from involuntary signals but are even
somewhat misled by what they observe if they cannot rely on the criteria of
lower gross payoff and short bargaining time.
We have also seen in Section 5.5 that on average the onlookers cannot
distinguish true from false cost assertions. Of course, these ﬁndings do not
exclude the possibility that among the onlookers there are some whose
truth detection capabilities are much better than the average and others
for whom these capabilities are much lower than the average.10 However,
as far as we can see, the data show no evidence in this direction. In any
10Ekman and his co-authors conducted extensive subject pool studies in these contexts and
provide evidence that some “professional lie catchers” can achieve high accuracy rates (see
Ekman, 1985, and Ekman et al., 1999 and the references cited therein).
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case, the assumption of a widely spread culturally acquired truth detection
capability does not ﬁnd support by our experimental study.
In the literature, we often ﬁnd comparisons between face-to-face and
anonymous game interaction (Dawes et al., 1977; Orbell et al., 1988; Isaac
and Walker, 1988; Frey and Bohnet, 1995; Sally, 1995; Valley et al., 1998;
Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998; Brosig et al., 1999). The general conclu-
sion is that face-to-face interaction leads to more cooperation and more
egalitarian outcomes. In this connection, one sometimes ﬁnds explanations
based on the involuntary truth-signalling hypothesis referring to the the-
oretical work of Robert Frank. Although our study does not examine the
difference between formal anonymous interaction and face-to-face bargain-
ing, our results suggest that any differences which may be there are not due
to involuntary truth-signalling. Yet alternative explanations are not difﬁcult
to ﬁnd. Face-to-face interaction may per se create more cooperation, more
trust, and more consideration of the interests of the other participants (cf.
Roth, 1995, for a related point of view).
The involuntary truth-signalling hypothesis may have some merit in other
contexts as they occur in the psychological experiments discussed in Sec-
tion 1. Involuntary truth-signalling, however, does not seem to take place
in the context of bargaining situations.
APPENDIX A: WRITTEN DIRECTIONS
(TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN)
Rules for Bargainers
Everybody knows that it is difﬁcult in negotiations to assess how far the bargaining partner
can give in, e.g., when buying a used car. In our experiment you will be placed in the following
bargaining position, in which bargaining skills are required.
1. You bargain with a randomly chosen bargaining partner about the division of DM 30.
2. Before the bargaining event, you throw a dice in order to determine whether you
have costs of DM 12 or not. In the case of a throw of 1, 2, 3 you have costs and in the case of
a throw of 4, 5, 6 you do not have costs. In the case of costs, DM 12 are subtracted from your
bargaining outcome. Your cost situation will be marked at the bottom of this page. Nobody
except you and the experimenter knows your cost situation. You do not know whether your
bargaining partner has costs. Nor will the information about the cost situation of any bargainer
be revealed to anyone after the experiment has been completed.
3. The bargaining event lasts maximally 10 minutes but could stop earlier if you want
it to. After the bargaining event, each of the bargainers writes down the agreement reached
according to his or her understanding in the bargainer form on the next page. If the bargainer
forms match in the division of the DM 30 you receive a corresponding payoff deducted by
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the costs if you have costs. Note that a bargainer with costs has to demand at least DM 12
if he or she does not want to suffer a loss. (Losses are deducted from the DM 10 that each
bargainer receives for the participation in the experiment.) If the bargainers cannot agree
upon a division, if the bargainer forms do not match, or if the outcomes sum up to more than
DM 30, neither bargainer receives a payoff from the bargaining.
4. The bargaining is video-taped and observed by students.
5. Try to realize the highest possible payoff.
From now on until the end of the experiment you are not permitted to communicate with
other participants outside the bargaining event. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
© costs © no costs
Statement
1. I agree that I am video- and audio-taped during my participation in the experi-
ment. I waive all claims that may arise in connection with the taping.
2. I agree that the tapes are preserved by the university for an indeﬁnite time and
are used for scientiﬁc analyses.
Date  Signature 
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Rules for Onlookers
In a moment you will be witness of 12 bargaining events in which your assessment skills
are demanded. Earlier, the bargainers obtained the following bargaining instructions:
1. You bargain with a randomly chosen bargaining partner about the division of
DM 30.
2. Before the bargaining event, you throw a dice in order to determine whether you
have costs of DM 12 or not. In the case of a throw of 1, 2, 3 you have costs and in the case of
a throw of 4, 5, 6 you do not have costs. In the case of costs, DM 12 are subtracted from your
bargaining outcome. Your cost situation will be marked at the bottom of this page. Nobody
except you and the experimenter knows your cost situation. You do not know whether your
bargaining partner has costs. Nor will the information about the cost situation of any bargainer
be revealed to anyone after the experiment has been completed.
3. The bargaining event lasts maximally 10 minutes but could stop earlier if you want
it to. After the bargaining event, each of the bargainers writes down the agreement reached
according to his or her understanding in the bargainer form on the next page. If the bargainer
forms match in the division of the DM 30 you receive a corresponding payoff deducted by
the costs if you have costs. Note that a bargainer with costs has to demand at least DM 12
if he or she does not want to suffer a loss. (Losses are deducted from the DM 10 that each
bargainer receives for the participation in the experiment.) If the bargainers cannot agree
upon a division, if the bargainer forms do not match, or if the outcomes sum up to more than
DM 30, neither bargainer receives a payoff from the bargaining.
4. The bargaining is video-taped and observed by students.
5. Try to realize the highest possible payoff.
Your task is to guess from the bargaining process who among the 24 bargainers has costs
and who has no costs. In a bargaining event, one, both, or neither bargainer may have costs.
DM 300 are divided among those onlookers who achieve the highest number of correct
guesses, DM 100 are divided among those who achieve the second highest number, and DM
50 among those who have the third highest number.
From now on until the end of the experiment you are not permitted to communicate in any
form during the whole experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
Please mark the bargainers who you think have costs with a cross:
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APPENDIX B: ONLOOKER DATA
The following table shows the individual guesses of all onlookers as well as their gender.
The onlookers in each session are sorted according to their numbers of correct guesses. All
onlookers are undergraduate students of economics.
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